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I have been asked to discuss various models that might be available
to address crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during its murderous
reign in the 1970s. Before turning to these, I would first like to identify
several overarching considerations pertinent to the question, which model
is most appropriate for Cambodia?
Let me begin by noting a paradox that lies at the heart of the issues
addressed by this panel. On the one hand, since Nuremberg there has
been a general acknowledgment, in principle if not always honored in
practice, that some crimes are of genuinely universal concern and
responsibility. That responsibility is captured by the very name of such
offenses-"crimes against humanity." This conference, and this panel,
affirm the degree to which crimes against the human condition engage
international regard and responsibility.
Yet on the other hand, responses to such crimes must, in a
meaningful way, reflect the peculiar social and historical culture of the
country in which they occurred if the process of accountability is to
achieve its central aims. There cannot be a one-size-fits-all response to
crimes against human dignity.
Let me elaborate on both points, beginning with the first.
International legal responsibility for some offenses is reflected in
the fact that genocide, certain war crimes, and crimes against humanity are
subject to universal jurisdiction. Significantly, too, in a decision rendered
on July 11, 1996, the International Court of Justice held that the obligation
under the Genocide Convention to prevent and to punish genocide is not
territorially limited.'
*
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1. The case, brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Yugoslavia, alleges that the
respondent state committed genocide. In response to Yugoslavia's claim that the Court lacked
jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention because the acts allegedly giving rise to responsibility
by Yugoslav authorities occurred in Bosnia, the court wrote: "[T]he rights and obligations
enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations erga ormnes. The Court notes that the
obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially
limited by the Convention." Decision on Preliminary Objections, Application of the Convention
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This dimension of international law is deeply rooted in moral
obligation. The nature of that responsibility was suggested in a recent
article in the Washington Post about a lawsuit by a Holocaust survivor
against Swiss banks. Those banks, the plaintiff alleged, withheld money
deposited by her father before he fell victim to the Nazi machinery of
death. The Post article quotes the plaintiffs husband reading a passage
from the Talmud, which describes a debate among ancient rabbis: "If a
mouse steals a piece of cheese and runs into a hole, then who's
responsible? It's the hole who's responsible. If he didn't have the place to
hide it, then he wouldn't steal it." This passage evokes the basic principle
underlying international law's recognition of universal responsibility for
assuring that those who commit crimes against humanity are brought to the
bar of justice. If a state provides sanctuary to Nazis, it has breached the
vow of universal conscience, "Never Again." If the world fails to demand
justice for the sweeping crimes of the Khmer Rouge, it is complicit in
those crimes.
Further, by the very nature of crimes against humanity,
accountability will come, if at all, only when international society demands
it. The decision of a United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg is
instructive. "Crimes against humanity are acts committed in the course of
wholesale and systematic violation of life and liberty," the Tribunal wrote
in the Ohlendorfcase. The Tribunal continued:
It is to be observed that insofar as international jurisdiction
is concerned, the concept of crimes against humanity does
not apply to offenses for which the criminal code of any
well-ordered state makes adequate provision. They can
only come within the purview of this basic code of
humanity because the state involved, owing to
indifference, impotency or complicity, has been unable or
has refused to halt the crimes and punish the criminals.
But if crimes against humanity engage the responsibility of
international society, an effective response must include measures that
meaningfully reflect the culture and circumstances of the nation that
endured those crimes. In particular, to the extent that the aim of a process
of accountability is to inoculate a country like Cambodia against the
revival of brutal governance, the most effective approach will reflect the
social, historical, and legal culture in which the crimes occurred.

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996
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Press accounts of the recent amnesty accorded Ieng Sary suggest
the importance of this issue in. respect of Cambodia. Much of the press
coverage surrounding Ieng Sary's demand for an amnesty suggested that
criminal prosecution might sound a dissonant chord in Cambodian
Buddhist culture. For example, in an article on September 8 entitled Why
Cambodia May Overlook Its Past, a reporter for the New York Times
wrote:
Many Cambodians seem to prefer not to reopen old
wounds, and on the streets of Phnom Penh today people
seem more eager for peace than for retribution. Though
human rights groups and foreign governments, along with
a number of Cambodian public figures, voice dismay at the
respectful treatment of Mr. leng Sary, most people here
seem prepared to accept his proposal to forget the past. 'It
does not feel good to have people who killed our parents
coming to live with us, but as Buddhists, we are taught not
to seek revenge,' said a restaurant owner in Phnom Penh.
I cannot say whether, or to what extent, this reporter's account
fairly represents Cambodian views. I have seen and heard other accounts
that give cause to doubt sweeping claims that prosecution of Khmer Rouge
atrocities would offend Cambodian values. Notably, when he granted Ieng
Sary a royal amnesty at the behest of Cambodia's two Prime Ministers but
against his own conscience, Prince Sihanouk made plain that such a pardon
should not prevent an international tribunal from prosecuting leng Sary.
While Prince Sihanouk of course does not speak for all Cambodians, I
suspect that he speaks for many. Again, I cannot speak with any authority
about whether prosecutions would, as the Times suggests, comport with
Cambodian values. My point is simply that, to be effective in inoculating
a society against a recurrence of state violence, a process of accountability
must be rooted in that society's culture.
Up to a point. We surely would not want to defer to culturalrelativist arguments counseling against accountability when the culture in
question is one of wholesale impunity. A key aim of trials following
sweeping violations of personal integrity is to help dispel the culture of
impunity that enabled the crimes to occur. In some respects, then, the
demands of universal justice may in fact require some measure of
meddling with patterns of national culture.
The complex concerns on which I have focused are, as I have
suggested, especially pertinent to the extent that a process of accountability
seeks to prevent a country from returning to abuses of the past and to
advance reconciliation within a deeply riven nation. But these are not the
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only aims. Consider, for example, the work of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. This Tribunal,
established by the United Nations Security Council, seeks not only to
establish a foundation for peace and security in Bosnia, but also to
broadcast a global message: Those anywhere who might in the future
contemplate crimes against the human condition should think again. They
will not get away with it.
That processes aimed at establishing accountability may have
multiple audiences surely complicates the question, what is the best model
for a country like Cambodia? Criminal prosecution might, for example,
send the strongest message to a global audience, while a more broadranging process, like that currently underway in South Africa, might best
promote the sort of deliberative reflection that enables a brutalized society
to heal.
How to reconcile these competing claims presents questions to
which no easy answers are available. I would suggest, however, that we
must take this challenge far more seriously than has heretofore been
common. Too often, transnational efforts to establish accountability for
gross abuses have evinced a tendency to disregard the voices of those most
directly concerned.
With these general considerations in mind, let me turn now to the
principal question which I have been asked to address-what models of
accountability are available in respect of the Cambodian killing fields? A
range of measures are potentially available to address -the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge, though it remains doubtful whether any will garner the
political support essential to their success.
One option is the institution of a contentious case before the
International Court of Justice. Such a case must be brought against
Cambodia, which is a party to the Genocide Convention, by another state
party. The case would, in essence, allege that the Cambodian government
breached its treaty obligation to prevent and punish genocide.
The excellent report prepared by Jason Abrams and Steven Ratner
for the United States Department of State on accountability for Khmer
Rouge atrocities concluded, however, that this option is improbable for
several reasons.
First, despite diligent efforts, nongovernmental
organizations have been unable to convince any government to institute
proceedings against Cambodia before the International Court of Justice,
Second, with the Khmer Rouge no longer in control of Cambodia's
government, it might not be possible to establish that there is a genuine
dispute between a petitioner state and the government of Cambodia.
The recent decision of the Cambodian government to grant an
amnesty to Ieng Sary might change this legal calculation, establishing a
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genuine dispute under the Genocide Convention. In particular, a petitioner
state could allege that Cambodia breached its explicit duty under the
Convention to punish genocide by granting leng Sary an amnesty. Still, it
scarcely seems likely that a state will institute such a case now, when none
could be found to do so throughout the years when the Khmer Rouge
constituted, or was part of, the internationally recognized government of
Cambodia. Further, as the State Department report concludes, even if
such a case were instituted and led to a finding that Cambodia had
breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention, it is by no means
clear that such a judgment would stimulate national prosecutions in
Cambodia.
National prosecutions would, of course, be the response to those
crimes of the Khmer Rouge constituting genocide that is most consistent
with Cambodia's obligations under the Genocide Convention. But national
prosecutions against leng Sary are presumably precluded by the recent
amnesty, and in any event that amnesty may signal the Cambodian
government's general disinclination to institute genocide prosecutions
against the Khmer Rouge.
Even if these obstacles could be surmounted, Cambodia's national
legal system is by all accounts in a state of shambles-in no small measure
a result of Khmer Rouge policies. International support for national
prosecutions would therefore be necessary, and also problematic. The
specter of a clash of legal cultures would loom large over such a venture.
Foreign legal advisors assisting Cambodians would surely insist on
benchmarks to measure the success of their efforts and to justify their
continuing support. But such a process often entails the sort of paternalism
that has been problematic in other contexts, like Ethiopia. National
prosecutions underway in Addis Ababa for crimes against humanity have
been the object of well meaning, but at times counterproductive,
international advice. These risks should not deter us from pursuing more
effective approaches in Cambodia, but should sound a cautionary note
about how to proceed.
As Prince Sihanouk observed, any amnesty conferred by
Cambodian authorities would not prevent an international tribunal from
prosecuting leng Sary (or others) for the murderous policies of the 1970s.
What, then, are the prospects for such a tribunal?
It is unlikely that the Security Council would establish an ad hoc
tribunal for Cambodia's crimes similar to the tribunals it created for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Both of those tribunals were created as
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
As such, they were predicated on Security Council determinations that the
situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda constituted threats to
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international peace and security. Such a finding in respect of Cambodia
seems unlikely, to put it mildly. Further, even if a permanent international
criminal court is established, it is unlikely that such a tribunal would have
retroactive jurisdiction.
One option that might be available is the establishment of an
"international penal tribunal" by states parties to the Genocide Convention
pursuant to article VI of that treaty. Presumably such a tribunal could be
established by a small number of states. But Cambodia almost surely
would have to agree to cooperate with such a tribunal. In light of the
recent amnesty for leng Sary, the present government does not seem
disposed to support such an effort.
Another model for establishing accountability for crimes of the
past is through a "truth commission"-a body that attempts to establish a
comprehensive and authoritative record of serious abuses committed
during a specific period. In fact, such commissions represent "models"
rather than "a model" for accountability, as their mandates, powers, and
modes of operation have varied considerably from one country to another.
One of the principal virtues of truth commissions is the extent to
which they can, potentially, engage society in a broadly gauged and
broad-ranging deliberative process about its past. This process is, I
believe, essential in securing one of the principal aims of accountability in
nations recently scourged by crimes against human dignity.
Such
collective deliberation may help strengthen the sinews of civic culture,
fostering a deep commitment to personal rights and a demand that they be
respected. At the same time, a national truth-telling process provides a
framework for healing the wounds of those who endured atrocious crimes.
In these and other respects, the process of accountability engendered by
truth commissions tends to be more inclusive than that of criminal trials.
One noteworthy process is now underway in South Africa. To
reckon with apartheid-era crimes, the Mandela government has established
an architecture of accountability that ingeniously facilitates both truth and
justice. To qualify for amnesty for politically-motivated human rights
abuses, potential and actual defendants must fully confess to their role in
such crimes. Even then, amnesty may be denied if the confessor's crime
is deemed disproportionate to its political aim.
This approach creates an incentive for human rights violators to
come forward which has been missing in other countries that have recently
emerged from periods of sweeping abuses, several of which have
established truth commissions. Typically, such commissions have failed to
breach the wall of silence surrounding participants in the prior regime's
system of abuse. Instead, in Latin America, where the institution of truth
commissions was inaugurated, such initiatives typically have encountered,
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and perhaps helped inspire, a closing of ranks among those who were
complicit in state-sponsored violence.
In South Africa, in contrast, the information obtained from those
who seek amnesty through confession can lead to prosecution of those
whom they implicate, while the threat of prosecution may prompt a
broader reckoning with the past through an ever-widening circle of
disclosures. Finally, the amnesty committee's residual power to deny an
amnesty may prevent the South African approach from ultimately ratifying
wholesale impunity.
The South Africa experience is a model in other respects as well.
When South Africans grappled with the question of how to deal with
abuses of their past, they received considerable international support in this
deliberative process, and explored the experiences of other countries, such
as Chile, that had tried to come to terms with their legacy of dictatorship.
Ultimately, however, South Africa found its own solution-informed by
the experiences of other nations, but uniquely South African.
In conclusion, then, I have tried to suggest that, as we seek to meet
our responsibility for enforcing universal conscience, we must recognize
that our charge begins at precisely the place where universal and local
values converge. To make meaningful the vow "Never Again", there
must be a genuinely global demand for justice in respect of crimes against
human conscience. But if this project demands universal engagement, its
basic themes must be composed, above all, by those who have endured
offenses against their humanity.

